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Abstract
It is suggested that probabilities need not apply at all to matter in the
physical world, which may be entirely described by the amplitudes given by
the quantum mechanical state. Instead, probabilities may apply only to con-
scious perceptions in the mental world. Such perceptions may not form unique
sequences that one could call individual minds.
1 Probabilities in Quantum Mechanics
One of the most mysterious aspects of quantum mechanics is its usual prob-
abilistic interpretation. There is first the uncertainty of which amplitudes should
be squared to get probabilities. Then there is the even deeper puzzle of what the
resulting probabilities mean.
For example, one viewpoint on the first question is that whenever a measurement
is made, the amplitude for each macroscopically-distinct outcome should be squared
to get a probability. (More precisely, one takes a complete set of orthogonal pro-
jection operators, each representing one of the macroscopically-distinct outcomes.
One projects the wavefunction by one of these projection operators to get a reduced
wavefunction. Then one takes the inner product of this reduced wavefunction with
itself—i.e., “squares the amplitude”—to get the probability of the corresponding
outcome. This probability is the same as the expectation value of the projection
operator in the quantum state given by the original wavefunction.)
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A broader viewpoint is that the expectation value of any projection operator
is a probability for the corresponding “event.” An even broader viewpoint is that
one can square the amplitude given by projecting the wavefunction not just by one,
but by a whole sequence of (possibly noncommuting) projection operators repre-
senting a “history” or sequence of “events.” (For the resulting probabilities to obey
the sum rules under a coarse-graining of the projection operators, the sequences
must obey certain consistency conditions [1, 2].) One can extend this viewpoint, of
assigning probabilities to “consistent histories,” yet further to the viewpoint that
one can project the wavefunction by sums of sequences of projection operators that
represent coarser-grained histories. (Then one needs “decoherence” conditions for
the resulting probabilities to obey the sum rules for “decohering histories” [3, 4, 5].)
An even further extension is the viewpoint that probabilities are the real parts of
the expectation values of sums of sequences of projection operators, whenever these
obey a “linear positivity” condition of being nonnegative, giving probabilities for
“linearly positive histories” that automatically obey the sum rules [6].
Besides this sample of the wide variety of viewpoints of what quantities should be
assigned probabilities in quantum mechanics, there is the enigma of how to interpret
the resulting probabilities. One attitude is that a unique one of the possible “events”
or “histories” actually occurs, with the probability assigned by quantum mechanics,
and that the other possibilities do not. This attitude still leaves open the question
of whether the “probability” is a “frequency” in an ensemble of actual worlds, or
whether it is a “propensity” in a single world and what that could mean. If the
latter, what is it that actually makes the choice of the actual “event” or “history”
from those potentially possible?
Another attitude is that all of the possible “events” or “histories” with nonzero
probabilities actually occur, but with measures proportional to the probabilities.
This “many-worlds” interpretation [7] is very similar to the frequency interpretation
in a ensemble of actual worlds mentioned above, but it need not have the implication
that our present world is a single member of the ensemble that has a definite (albeit
unpredictable) future.
In any of these approaches in which one or all of the possibilities are actualized,
there is the further question of which set of possibilities is singled out. In general,
there are many different allowed sets of possibilities (e.g., different sets of orthogonal
projection operators, or of sequences of projection operators, that each add up to the
identity operator). If only one “event” or only one “history” actually occurs, there
must be mysterious choices both of the set of possibilities and of the single actual
element within that chosen set. If, on the other hand, all of the possible “events” or
“histories” with nonzero probabilities in a given set of possibilities actually occur,
there must apparently still be a mysterious choice of this set of possibilities out of
the family of all such sets of possibilities.
One conceivable answer is that all possibilities in all sets of possibilities actually
occur, with measures given by the probabilities deduced from quantum mechanics
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in one of the ways discussed above. Since, for a normalized quantum state, these
probabilities are designed to add up to unity for a single set of possibilities, the
measures will sum to more than unity when one adds up all the sets. In fact,
typically the number of allowed sets of possibilities is infinite (e.g., even for a two-
state spin-half system, there is a rank-one projection operator for each direction
in space and hence an infinite number of such projection operators). This means
that the sum of the measures for all possibilities typically is unnormalizable, which
may lead to problems. (These problems may be avoidable. For example, in the
spin-half system, the sum of the quantum probabilities for all of the infinite number
of possibilities for the spin direction is infinite, but instead of simply adding these
quantum probabilities, one can divide by the total solid angle of the unit sphere
of spin directions to get a probability density which can then be integrated over a
nonzero solid angle to get a normalized second-order probability that the spin is in
a direction within that solid angle.)
2 Sensible Quantum Mechanics
Here I shall propose instead that probabilities not be applied at all to the physical
world (the “matter” of the title), which is instead to be described entirely by the
quantum amplitudes of its wavefunction (or by the elements of its density matrix,
or possibly by a more general description, such as a C∗-algebra state). I suggest
instead that probabilities apply only to the mental world of conscious perceptions.
In this viewpoint, and in a certain loose manner of speaking in which “mind” is this
whole mental world rather than a sequence of perceptions, probabilities are only in
the mind.
Consider the set of all possible perceptions p, which I shall call the mental world
M . By a perception, I mean all that one is consciously aware or consciously expe-
riencing at one moment. This is what Lockwood, in a book expressing what seems
to be ideas mostly concordant with mine [8], calls a “phenomenal perspective” or
“maximal experience.” In another way of putting it, my p denotes a total “raw
feel” that one has at once. It can include components such as a visual sensation, an
auditory sensation, a pain, a conscious memory, a conscious impression of a thought
or belief, etc., but it does not include a sequence of more than one immediate per-
ception that in other proposals might be considered to be strung together to form
a stream of consciousness of an individual mind.
Suppose that there is a basic measure on the mental world which weights each
perception equally, which I shall denote by dp without implying a choice between
the conceptual possibilities that the space of perceptions is discrete (in which case
dp simply counts the number of perceptions) or continuous (in which case dp might
represent some basic multi-dimensional integration measure or volume element).
Now I shall postulate that our actual world does not have all possible perceptions
occurring equally, but instead that there is a nontrivial measure m(p)dp, the non-
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negative real scalar function or measure density m(p) times the basic measure, for
the perceptions in our actual world. Thus I get the following basic assumption:
Measure Axiom for Perceptions: There is a nontrivial measure on the space
of (maximal) perceptions p, namely m(p) times the basic measure dp that weights
each perception equally.
Because of the fact that our perceptions seem to be more simply explained by
assuming that they are related to a physical world, I shall assume a principle of
psycho-physical parallelism, that the nontrivial part m(p) of the measure for per-
ceptions is a functional of the properties of the physical world.
For example, if the physical world were represented by a single classical trajectory
in some phase space, it might be natural to assume that m(p) has a form of a sum of
Kronecker deltas or an integral of a discrete set of Dirac delta function distributions
over sequences of perceptions that a set of conscious beings has as the point moves
along the trajectory in phase space. In other words, each point in phase space might
naturally be assigned a discrete set of conscious perceptions, one for each conscious
being whose point in its phase space is derived from the point in the phase space
of the entire system (e.g., the universe). Even in this classical model, there can be
many perceptions at one time, but each is ascribed to a different conscious being.
If the physical world is represented by a quantum state that has no preferred
classical trajectories (such as do occur in Bohm’s version of quantum mechanics [9],
but which I shall not further consider here), then it seems unnatural to assume that
m(p) is completely concentrated on a discrete sequence of trajectories, one for each
conscious observer. Instead, in view of the linearity of quantum mechanics, I propose
the following basic assumption for interpreting quantum mechanics ‘sensibly,’ i.e.,
in terms of sensations or perceptions:
Sensible Quantum Axiom: Each m(p) is given by the expectation value of
a corresponding positive perception or “maximal experience” operator E(p) in the
quantum state of the universe. As a formula,
m(p) = 〈E(p)〉 = 〈ψ|E(p)|ψ〉 = Tr(E(p)ρ), (1)
where the third expression applies if the quantum state is represented by the wave-
function or pure state |ψ〉, and the fourth expression applies if the quantum state is
represented by the statistical operator or density matrix ρ. (The second expression
can apply in more general situations, such as in C∗-algebra.)
In this framework, which I shall call Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the quantum
state of the universe is fixed, in the Heisenberg picture I am using, and never collapses
or changes to another state, so the von Neumann intervention 1 [10] is assumed never
to occur. Neither is there assumed to be any nonlinearity in quantum mechanics
when consciousness is involved, as Wigner proposed [11]. If the quantum state
and all the perception operators E(p) are known, one can in principle calculate
from Eq. (1) the measure density m(p) for all perceptions. (Of course, I am not
competent to give these essential elements, so the present proposal is a framework,
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on the level of other frameworks or interpretations of quantum mechanics, rather
than a complete theory.) Since all maximal perceptions p with m(p) > 0 really
occur in this framework, it is completely deterministic if the quantum state and the
E(p) are determined: there are no random or truly probabilistic elements in this
framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics.
Thus Sensible Quantum Mechanics has no need for any axiom of what is typically
called “measurement” [10], or what Unruh calls “determination” [12] to distinguish
this hypothetical process from the physical measurement interactions that are en-
coded in the quantum state and the structure of the operators. In particular, there
are no probabilistic results of such “determinations.”
Nevertheless, because the framework has measures for perceptions, one can read-
ily use them to calculate quantities that can be interpreted as conditional probabil-
ities. One can consider sets of perceptions A, B, etc., defined in terms of properties
of the perceptions. For example, A might be the set of perceptions in which there
is a feeling that the universe is approximately described by a Friedman-Robertson-
Walker model, and B might be the set of perceptions in which there is a feeling that
the universe is approximately described by a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model
with an age (at the perceived time) between ten and twenty billion years. By sum-
ming or integrating m(p)dp over the sets A, B, A ∩ B (= B in the example here),
etc., one can get corresponding measures m(A), m(B), m(A ∩ B), etc. Then one
can interpret
P (B|A) ≡ m(A ∩ B)/m(A) (2)
as the conditional probability that the perception is in the set B, given that it
is in the set A. In our example, this would be the conditional probability that
a perception including the feeling that the universe is approximately described by
a Friedman-Robertson-Walker model, also has the feeling that at the time of the
perception the age is between ten and twenty billion years.
An analogue of this conditional “probability” is the conditional probability that
a person in 1994 is the Queen of England. If we consider a model of all the five to six
billion people, including the Queen, that we agree to consider as our contemporary
humans on Earth in 1994, then at the basic level of this model the Queen certainly
exists in it; there is nothing random or probabilistic about her existence. But if
the model weights each of the five to six billion people equally, then one can in a
manner of speaking say that the conditional probability that one of these persons
is the Queen is somewhat less than 2×10−10. I am proposing that it is in the
same manner of speaking that one can assign conditional probabilities to sets of
perceptions, even though there is nothing truly random about them at the basic
level.
When one’s perceptions include feelings of belief about what is ascribed to be
external events or histories (e.g., results of experiments in the physical world rather
than in the mind), and when it is believed that these beliefs are an accurate repre-
sentation of some aspects of those ascribed-to-be-external events or histories, it is
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tempting to the theorist to interpret the conditional probabilities of the perceptions
as giving conditional probabilities for those aspects of the ascribed-to-be-external
events or histories. One may even go further and develop formalisms for directly
calculating probabilities of such events or histories. With this viewpoint one can say
that the historical development of quantum mechanics has been fruitful (or more
strictly, I have a feeling that what I perceive to have been its historical development
was fruitful), but it has left unexplained which events or histories are to be assigned
probabilities and what those probabilities mean.
Thus I am proposing that at the basic level, probabilities (or, more strictly,
measures) have meaning only for perceptions in the mental world and should not
be assigned to anything (e.g., to events or histories) in the physical world of matter.
In this sense “probabilities don’t matter.”
On the other hand, I am not saying that it is forbidden to assign conditional
“probabilities” to events and/or histories in the physical world. They can be much
simpler to calculate than those in the mental world given by Eqs. (1) and (2),
since we don’t know what the perception operators E(p) are, and these physical
“probabilities” may often give good approximations for the mental probabilities.
Indeed, I have been happy to help play the game of broadening the scope of histories
to which one can assign mathematically-consistent probabilities [6]. However, I am
now proposing that these probabilities are not fundamental and need not be added
to complicate the basic ontology of a measurable set of perceptions (which I have
been calling the mental world) and a quantum state of the universe (which I have
been calling the physical world), with the measure and interpretation given entirely
by the Measure Axiom for Perceptions and the Sensible Quantum Axiom above.
Goldstein has pointed out [14] that one can simplify the ontology and avoid the
assumption of a basic measure dp on the mental world by replacing the measure den-
sity m(p) for single perceptions p with a measure µ(S) on sets S of perceptions and
by replacing the perception operators E(p) with a positive-operator-valued measure,
say A(S). This alternative formulation is given in [15, 16]. Another way to minimize
the number of independent entities is to postulate that the basic measure dp is the
volume element of a Riemannian metric
gijdp
idpj = Tr{[E(pi + dpi)− E(pi)][E(pj + dpj)− E(pj)]}, (3)
if this is finite and nondegenerate, so that the basic measure is determined by the
perception operators themselves.
3 Perceptions rather than Minds
Another point I should emphasize is that in Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the
set of all perceptions is basic, but not any higher power of this set. In other words,
perceptions and the measure m(p)dp on them are basic, but not n-tuples of per-
ceptions, or measures on n-tuples of perceptions. Thus, for example, there is no
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fundamental notion of a correlation between individual complete perceptions given
by any measure. (On the other hand, if a perception can be broken up into compo-
nent parts, say A and B, there can be a correlation between the parts, in the sense
that the measure m(A ∩ B) for all perceptions containing the part A and the part
B need not be the same as m(A)m(B), the measure for all perceptions containing
A times the measure for all perceptions containing B. The enormous structure in
a single perception seems to suggest that such correlations within perceptions are
highly nontrivial, but I see no evidence for a nontrivial correlation between maximal
perceptions, since no two different maximal perceptions can be perceived together.)
Furthermore, Sensible Quantum Mechanics postulates no fundamental equiva-
lence relation on the set of perceptions. For example, the measure gives no way of
classifying different perceptions as to whether they belong to the same conscious
being (e.g., at different times) or to different conscious beings. The only such classi-
fication would be by the content (including the qualia) of the perceptions themselves,
which distinguish the perceptions, so that no two different perceptions, p 6= p′, have
the same content. Based upon my own present perception, I find it natural to sup-
pose that perceptions that could be put into the classification of being alert human
perceptions have such enormous structure that they could easily distinguish between
all of the 1011 or so persons that are typically assigned to our history of the human
race. However, I doubt that in a fundamental sense there is any absolute classifica-
tion that uniquely distinguishes each person in all circumstances. Therefore, in the
present framework perceptions are fundamental, but persons (or individual minds)
are not, although they certainly do seem to be very good approximate entities that
I do not wish to deny. The concept of persons and minds certainly occurs in some
sense as part of the content of my present perception, even if there is no absolute
definition of it in the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics itself.
In this way the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics proposed here is a
particular manifestation of Hume’s ideas [13], that “what we call a mind, is nothing
but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations,
and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect simplicity and identity” (p.
207), and that the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions”
(p. 252). As he explains in the Appendix (p. 634), “When I turn my reflexion on
myself, I never can perceive this self without some one or more perceptions; nor can I
ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. ’Tis the composition of these, therefore,
which forms the self.” (Here I should note that what Hume calls a perception may
be only one component of the “phenomenal perspective” or “maximal experience”
[8] that I have been calling a perception p, so one p can include “one or more
perceptions” in Hume’s sense.)
Furthermore, each perception operator need not have any precise location in
either space or time associated with it, so there need be no fundamental place or time
connected with each perception. Indeed, Sensible Quantum Mechanics can easily
survive a replacement of spacetime with some other structure (e.g., superstrings) as
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more basic in the physical world. Of course, the contents of a perception can include
a sense or impression of the time of the perception, just as my present perception
at the perceived time of writing this includes a feeling that it is now 1994 A.D., so
the set of perceptions p must include perceptions with such beliefs, but there need
not be any precise time in the physical world associated with a perception. That
is, perceptions are ‘outside’ physical spacetime (even if spacetime is a fundamental
element of the physical world, which I doubt).
As a consequence of these considerations, there are no unique time-sequences of
perceptions to form an individual mind or self in Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In
this way the present framework appears to differ from those proposed by Squires
[17], Albert and Loewer [18], and Stapp [19]. (Stapp’s also differs in having the
wavefunction collapse at each “Heisenberg actual event,” whereas the other two
agree with mine in having a fixed quantum state, in the Heisenberg picture, which
never collapses.) Lockwood’s proposal [8] seems to be more similar to mine, though
he also proposes (p. 232) “a continuous infinity of parallel such streams” of con-
sciousness, “differentiating over time,” whereas Sensible Quantum Mechanics has no
such stream as fundamental. On the other hand, later Lockwood [20] does explicitly
repudiate the Albert-Loewer many-minds interpretation, so there seems to me to
be little disagreement between Lockwood’s view and Sensible Quantum Mechan-
ics except for the detailed formalism and manner of presentation. Thus one might
label Sensible Quantum Mechanics as the Hume-Everett-Lockwood-Page (HELP)
interpretation, though I do not wish to imply that these other three scholars, on
whose work my proposal is heavily based, would necessarily agree with my present
formulation.
Of course, the perceptions themselves can include components that seem to be
memories of past perceptions or events. In this way it can be a very good approxima-
tion to give an approximate order for perceptions whose content include memories
that are correlated with the contents of other perceptions. It might indeed be that
the measure (or measure density) m(p) for perceptions including detailed memories
is rather heavily peaked around approximate sequences constructed in this way. But
I would doubt that either the content of the perceptions or the measure on the set
of perceptions would give unique sequences of perceptions that one could rigorously
identify with individual minds.
Because the physical state of our universe seems to obey the second law of
thermodynamics, with growing correlations in some sense, I suspect that the measure
density m(p) may have rather a smeared peak (or better, ridge) along approximately
tree-like structures of branching sequences of perceptions, with perceptions further
out along the branches having contents that includes memories that are correlated
with the present-sensation components of perceptions further back toward the trunks
of the trees. This is different from what one might expect from a classical model
with a discrete number of conscious beings, each of which might be expected to
have a unique sharp sequence or non-branching trajectory of perceptions. In the
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quantum case, I would expect that what are crudely viewed as quantum choices
would cause smeared-out trajectories to branch into larger numbers of smeared-out
trajectories with the progression of what we call time. If each smeared-out trajectory
is viewed as a different individual mind, we do get roughly a “many-minds” picture
that is analogous to the “many-worlds” interpretation [7], but in my framework of
Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the “many minds” are only approximate and are not
fundamental as they are in the proposal of Albert and Loewer [18]. Instead, Sensible
Quantum Mechanics is a “many-perceptions” or “many-sensations” interpretation.
One might label it philosophically as Mindless Sensationalism.
Even in a classical model, if there is one perception for each conscious being
at each moment of time in which the being is conscious, the fact that there may
be many conscious beings, and many conscious moments, can be said to lead to
a “many-perceptions” interpretation. However, in Sensible Quantum Mechanics,
there may be vastly more perceptions, since they are not limited to a discrete set
of one-parameter sharp sequences of perceptions, but occur for all perceptions p for
which m(p) is positive. In this way a quantum model may be said to be even “more
sensible” than a classical model.
One might fear that the present attack on the assumption of any definite notion
of a precise identity for persons or minds as sequences of perceptions would threaten
human dignity. Although I would not deny that I feel that it might, I can point
out that on the other hand, the acceptance of the viewpoint of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics might increase one’s sense of identity with all other humans and other
conscious beings. Furthermore, it might tend to undercut the motivations toward
selfishness that I perceive in myself if I could realize in a deeply psychological way
that what I normally anticipate as my own future perceptions are in no fundamental
way picked out from the set of all perceptions. (Of course, what I normally think of as
my own future perceptions are presumably those that contain memory components
that are correlated with the content of my present perception, but I do not see
logically why I should be any more concerned about trying to make such perceptions
happy than about trying to make perceptions happy that do not have such memories:
better to do unto others as I would wish they would do unto me.) Lockwood [21]
informs me that Parfit [22] has drawn similar conclusions from a Humean view.
4 Properties of Perception Operators
Although no one is competent to give the complete set of perception operators
E(p), one can speculate about some of their properties. In this speculation, a
theoretical physicist such as myself would like to be guided by the principles of
simplicity and of agreement with observations. Both are difficult, the former because
we do not know all that is logically possible and have a measure of the simplicity
of the different possibilities, and the latter because we do not have direct access to
more than one perception at once.
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On the former principle, it is because of simplicity that I do not stop at the
Measure Axiom for Perceptions but also postulate a physical quantum state and a
set of perception operators E(p) which give the measure density m(p) by the Sensible
Quantum Axiom. If one has the correct m(p) (as well as the basic measure dp,
which is a separate element from the set of perceptions if they are not discrete), the
Measure Axiom for Perceptions is logically sufficient for describing a measured set of
perceptions. It might seem to be complicating the theory to add a physical quantum
state and a set of perception operators E(p), but I believe that this structure of a
postulated physical world can give a simpler explanation of m(p) than just giving
it directly without this explanation in terms of a postulated physical world. In this
way the whole of the mental world and the physical world can be simpler than just
the mental world considered by itself. (One might also raise the reverse question
of whether the whole is simpler than the physical world alone, by which I mean
an alternative logically possible world in which all E(p) are zero, so that in it the
quantum state is the same as in ours, but no conscious perceptions occur.)
On the latter principle, the only agreement with observations that one can impose
is the assumption that one’s perception be not too atypical, i.e., that it have not
too low a measure density m(p). For example, if both the basic measure dp and
the quantum measure m(p)dp were integrable, over the set of all perceptions p,
to finite numbers, say b and q respectively, then one can ask that one’s particular
perception not have m(p) ≪ q/b, the latter being the average of m(p) over all
perceptions. Unfortunately, I see no reason why a simple theory should make either
of these integrals finite, since almost any finite number is more complex than infinity.
(Perhaps the fact that my present perception seems to have a large but not infinite
amount of information in it is evidence that the simplest complete theory is not
extremely simple, since I would expect an extremely simple theory to make typical
perceptions have either an extremely small or an infinite amount of information.)
Perhaps a more realistic approach one can make toward agreement with obser-
vations is to assume that the measure density m(p) for one’s perception is not much
lower than the measure density for slightly different perceptions. For example, if
one has a perception p of having made a certain quantum measurement n times
and having gotten m positive results, one can imagine another perception p′ which
is similar except for perceiving m′ positive results. Then one would like m(p) to
be not much lower than m(p′). If the measures (or measure densities) m(p) and
m(p′) of the perceptions p and p′ can to a good approximation be replaced by the
quantum-derived measures m˜(r) and m˜(r′) for the respective perceived results r and
r′ in the physical world, one can check whether m˜(r) is not much lower than m˜(r′).
In such cases there is considerable experimental evidence that the ordinary quan-
tum predictions are consistent with observations if m˜(r) is the expectation value of
a projection operator P (r) for the physical result r.
Similarly, it might be natural to assume that each perception measure density
m(p) is given by the expectation value of a projection operator, say one that projects
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onto the brain states that cause the perception, if indeed the perception is caused
by various brain states. However, before making this specific assumption, let me
make some weaker postulates that one could add to Sensible Quantum Mechanics
to make it more restrictive and yet have a more specific content:
Hypothesis A: The expectation value of each E(p) has a constant maximum
value, say unity, in the set of all normalized quantum states.
Assuming that the quantum state is normalizable (perhaps an overly restrictive
assumption), Hypothesis A and the resulting Sensible Quantum Mechanics A would
have 0 ≤ m(p) ≤ 1 for all p, and there would exist a normalizable quantum state
for each p such that the corresponding m(p) would be unity in that state.
Without some such restriction like that, one could leave all the explanation of
m(p) in the operators E(p) rather than in the quantum state. For example, one
could get m(p) to be any positive function whatsoever simply by choosing E(p) to
be that function times the identity operator, which would make m(p) independent
of the state (so long as the state is normalized so that the expectation of the identity
operator is unity; other normalizations would change the scale of the measure but
would leave the conditional probabilities of Eq. (2) unchanged). We would like to
assume that instead the E(p) are restricted so the explanation for the m(p) lies
largely in the quantum state.
Now Hypothesis A is still not highly restrictive, so one may wish to look for
more restrictions on the operators E(p). For example, one may be motivated by the
consistent or decohering histories approaches [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] to assume that perceptions
are connected with histories and so perhaps make the following assumption:
Hypothesis B: Each E(p) has the form E(p) = C†C/max(C†C), where C =
P (n)P (n−1) · · ·P (2)P (1) with the integer n and the projection operators P (i) all de-
pending on the perception p, and where max(C†C) is the maximum expectation
value of C†C in any normalized quantum state.
The denominator in the expression for E(p) in Hypothesis B is chosen so that
Hypothesis B is a special case of Hypothesis A, but one could also consider an
alternative Hypothesis B’ in which the denominator is omitted. One could also
consider generalizing Hypothesis B or B’ to B* or B*’ respectively, in which C is a
sum of sequences of projection operators, as is allowed in decohering histories [3].
It is certainly logically possible that perceptions might depend on histories rather
than events that one could consider localized on hypersurfaces of constant time if the
physical world has such a time. However, as a previous advocate of the ‘marvelous
moment’ approach to quantum mechanics in which only quantities on one such
hypersurface can be tested [23], I find it more believable to assume that perceptions
are caused by brain states which could be at one moment of time if there are such
things in the physical world. The generalization of this hypothesis to the case in
which there may not be a well-defined physical time leads me to make the following
restriction of Hypothesis B or B’ to the case in which the integer n is always 1:
Hypothesis C: E(p) = P (p), a projection operator that depends on the per-
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ception p.
Hypothesis C appears to be a specific mathematical realization of part of Lock-
wood’s proposal [8] (p. 215), that “a phenomenal perspective [what I have here
been calling simply a perception p] may be equated with a shared eigenstate of
some preferred (by consciousness) set of compatible brain observables.” Here I have
expressed the “equating” by Eq. (1), and presumably the “shared eigenstate” can
be expressed by a corresponding projection operator P (p).
I should also emphasize that if the same conscious perception is produced by
several different orthogonal “eigenstates of consciousness” (e.g., different states of a
brain and surroundings that give rise to the same perception p), then in Hypothesis
C the projection operator P (p) would be a sum of the corresponding rank-one pro-
jection operators and so would be a projection operator of rank higher than unity
(perhaps even infinite), which is what I would expect. On the other hand, if E(p)
were a sum of noncommuting projection operators corresponding to nonorthogonal
states, or a weighted sum of projection operators with weights different from unity,
then generically E(p) would not have the form of a projection operator P (p).
If one has a constrained system, such as a closed universe in general relativity, the
quantum state may obey certain constraint equations, such as the Wheeler-DeWitt
equations. The projection operators P (p) of perception in Hypothesis C may not
commute with these constraints, in which case they may give technically ‘unphys-
ical’ states when applied to the quantum state. But so long as their expectation
values can be calculated, that is sufficient for giving the perception measure density
m(p). What it means is that in Hypothesis C, the perception operators should be
considered as projection operators in the space of unconstrained states, even though
the actual physical state does obey the constraints.
Alternatively, if one wishes to write the perception operators E(p) as operators
within the space of constrained states, Hypothesis C could be modified to the follow-
ing assumption to give perception operators E(p) that commute with the constraints
and so keep the state ‘physical’:
Hypothesis C˜: E(p) = PCP (p)PC , where PC is the projection operator within
the space of unconstrained states that takes any state to the corresponding con-
strained state, and P (p) is a projection operator in the space of unconstrained
states that depends on the perception p.
One could obviously alternatively insert the projection operator PC before and
after the perception operators of Hypothesis B, B’, B*, or B*’ to get Hypothesis B˜,
B˜’, B˜*, or B˜*’ respectively.
One can also get something like Hypothesis C˜, say Hypothesis Cˆ, even for uncon-
strained systems if they have symmetries (e.g., the Poincare´ symmetries of quantum
field theory in a classical Minkowski spacetime, though one would not expect these
symmetries to survive when one includes gravity), since one might then expect that
E(p) should be invariant under the symmetry group with elements g. Then if one
starts with a projection operator P (p) that is not invariant under the action of each
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group element, say P (p) 6= gP (p)g−1, then one might expect E(p) to be propor-
tional to the sum or integral of gP (p)g−1 over the group elements g. Unless all these
different gP (p)g−1’s are orthogonal (which does not appear possible for a continuous
symmetry group), the resulting E(p) will generically not be a projection operator,
but it can be said to have arisen from one, which is what I would propose as the
translation of the marvelous moment assumption to Sensible Quantum Mechanics.
If one can learn what the E(p)’s are, one can compare them with the forms given
by these hypotheses and thereby distinguish between the consistent or decohering
histories approaches and the marvelous moment approach as I here propose they be
applied to conscious perceptions (if indeed any of them do). Of course, either of these
approaches could be applied without inconsistency to mathematical probabilities
that one might wish to define in the physical world, but in the present framework
of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, such probabilities are an unnecessary addition to
the ontology.
I should emphasize that in no case am I assuming that the E(p)’s commute for
different perceptions, or that the sum or integral of the E(p)’s over all perceptions is
the identity operator. Neither am I assuming that the resulting expectation values
m(p) in the particular quantum state of the universe are normalized so that their sum
or integral over all perceptions gives a finite number q, or that this number is unity,
though in any case the conditional probabilities given by Eq. (2) are automatically
normalized to give unity when summed over a complete set of disjoint sets B of
perceptions. Of course, if q is finite, one can simply rescale E(p) to e(p) = E(p)/q,
which rescalesm(p) tom(p) = m(p)/q that is normalized to give unity when summed
or integrated over all perceptions. This rescaling obviously leaves the conditional
probabilities of Eq. (2) invariant when m(A ∩ B) and m(A) there are replaced by
m(A∩B) andm(A) respectively. On the other hand, I am sceptical that the simplest
consistent description of our universe will give a normalizable m(p) (finite q).
If a perception operator E(p) is a projection operator, and the quantum state of
the universe is represented by the pure state |ψ〉, one can ascribe to the perception
p the pure Everett “relative state”
|p〉 =
E(p)|ψ〉
‖ E(p)|ψ〉 ‖
=
E(p)|ψ〉
〈ψ|E(p)E(p)|ψ〉1/2
. (4)
Alternatively, if the quantum state of the universe is represented by the density
matrix ρ, one can associate the perception with a relative density matrix
ρp =
E(p)ρE(p)
Tr[E(p)ρE(p)]
. (5)
Either of these formulas can be applied when the perception operator is not a pro-
jection operator, but then the meaning is not necessarily so clear.
If one has two perceptions p and p′, one can calculate an overlap fraction between
them as
f(p, p′) =
〈E(p)E(p′)〉〈E(p′)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E(p′)E(p′)〉
. (6)
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If the quantum state of the universe is pure, this is the same as the overlap prob-
ability between the two Everett relative states corresponding to the perceptions:
f(p, p′) = |〈p|p′〉|2. Thus one might in some sense say that if f(p, p′) is near unity,
the two perceptions are in nearly the same one of the Everett “many worlds,” but
if f(p, p′) is near zero, the two perceptions are in nearly orthogonal different worlds.
However, this is just a manner of speaking, since I do not wish to say that the
quantum state of the universe is really divided up into many different worlds. Thus
I do not wish to propose that f(p, p′) be interpreted as a fundamental element of
Sensible Quantum Mechanics. In any case, one can be conscious only of a single
perception at once, so there is no way in principle that one can test any properties
of joint perceptions such as f(p, p′).
5 Quantum Field Theory Model
Although Sensible Quantum Mechanics transcends quantum theories in which
space and time are fundamental, and although I believe that such theories will need
to be transcended to give a good theory of our universe, it might help to get a
better feel for the spacetime properties of perceptions by considering the context
of quantum field theory in an unquantized curved globally-hyperbolic background
spacetime in which spacetime points are unambiguously distinguished by the space-
time geometry (so that the Poincare´ symmetries are entirely broken and one need
not worry about integrating over gP (p)g−1’s to satisfy superselection rules for en-
ergy, momentum, and/or angular momentum [24]). This simplified model might in
some sense be a good approximation for part of the entire quantum state of the uni-
verse in a correct theory if there is one that does fit into the framework of Sensible
Quantum Mechanics and does give a suitable classical spacetime approximation.
In the Heisenberg picture used in this paper, the quantum state is independent of
time (i.e., of a choice of Cauchy hypersurface in the spacetime), but the Heisenberg
equations of evolution for the fundamental fields and their conjugate momenta can
be used to express the operators E(p) in terms of the fields and momenta on any
Cauchy hypersurface. The arbitrariness of the hypersurface means that even in
this quantum field theory with a well-defined classical spacetime, and even with a
definite foliation of the spacetime by a one-parameter (time) sequence of Cauchy
hypersurfaces, there is no unique physical time that one can assign to any of the
perceptions p; they are ‘outside’ time as well as space.
Furthermore, the operatorsE(p) in this simplified model are all likely to be highly
nonlocal in terms of local field operators on any Cauchy hypersurface, since quantum
field theories that we presently know do not seem to have enough local operators
to describe the complexities of an individual perception, unless one considers high
spatial derivatives of the field and conjugate momentum operators. However, for
a given one-parameter (time) sequence of Cauchy hypersurfaces, one might rather
arbitrarily choose to define a preferred time for each perception p as the time giving
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the Cauchy hypersurface on which the corresponding E(p), if expressed in terms
of fields and momenta on that hypersurface, has in some sense the smallest spatial
spread at that time.
For example, to give a tediously explicit ad hoc prescription, on a Cauchy hyper-
surface labeled by the time t one might choose a point P and a ball that is the set
of all points within a certain geodesic radius r of the point. Then one can define an
operator E ′(p; t, P, r) that is obtained from E(p) written in terms of the fields and
conjugate momenta at points on the hypersurface by throwing away all contribu-
tions that have any fields or conjugate momenta at points outside the ball of radius
r from the point P . Now define the overlap fraction
F (p; t, P, r) =
〈E(p)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E(p)〉
〈E(p)E(p)〉〈E ′(p; t, P, r)E ′(p; t, P, r)〉
. (7)
(If both E(p) and E ′(p; t, P, r) were projection operators, and the actual quantum
state were a pure state, then F would be the overlap probability between the states
obtained by projecting the actual quantum state by these projectors and normaliz-
ing.) If E(p) is nonlocal, this fraction F will be small if the radius r is small but
will be nearly unity if the radius r is large enough for the ball to encompass almost
all of the Cauchy hypersurface. For each perception p, time t, and point P , one
can find the smallest r that gives F = 1/2, say, and call that value of the radius
r(p; t, P ). Then one can find the point P = P (p; t) on the hypersurface that gives
the smallest r(p; t, P ) on that hypersurface for the fixed perception p and call the
resulting radius r(p; t). Finally, define the preferred time tp as the time t for which
r(p; t) is the smallest, and label that smallest value of r(p; t) for the fixed perception
p as rp.
If the perception operator E(p) for some human conscious perception is not
unduly nonlocal in the simplified model under present consideration, and if the
quantum state of the fields in the spacetime has macroscopic structures that at the
time tp of the perception are fairly well localized (e.g., with quantum uncertainties
less than a millimeter, say, which would certainly not be a generic state, even among
states which give a significant m(p) for the perception in question), one might expect
that at this time the ball within radius rp of the point P (p; tp) on the hypersurface
labeled by tp would be inside a human brain. It would be interesting if one could
learn where the point P (p; tp) is in a human brain, and what the radius rp is, for
various human perceptions, and how the location and size of this ball depends on
the perception p.
6 Questions and Speculations
One can use the framework of Sensible Quantum Mechanics to ask questions and
make speculations that would be difficult without such a framework. I shall here
give some examples, without intending to imply that Sensible Quantum Mechanics
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itself, even if true, would guarantee that these questions and speculations make
sense, but it does seem to allow circumstances in which they might.
First, in the model of quantum field theory on a classical spacetime with no
symmetries, and with a quantum state having well-localized human brains on some
Cauchy hypersurface labeled by time t, one might ask whether it is possible to have
two quite different perceptions, say p and p′, in nearly the same Everett world in
the sense of having the f(p, p′) of Eq. (6) near unity, and giving E(p) and E(p′)
both with the same preferred time tp = t and both localized (by the rather ad hoc
prescription above) in balls in the same brain. In other words, can one brain have
two different (maximal) perceptions in the same world at the same time, each not
aware of the other? Unless we are solipsists, we generally believe this is possible for
two separate brains, but would one brain be sufficient? Furthermore, if it is possible,
can the two balls (corresponding to p and p′ respectively) be overlapping spatially,
or need they be separate regions in the brain?
Second, one might ask whether and how the sum (or integral) of the measures
(or measure densities) m(p) associated with an individual brain region at the time t
depends on the brain characteristics. One might speculate that it might be greater
for brains that are in some sense more intelligent, so that in a crude sense brighter
brains have more perceptions. This could explain why you do not perceive yourself
to be an insect, for example, even though there are far more insects than humans.
To speculate even further, it might imply that your perception is not atypical even if
you perceive yourself to be more intelligent than the average person, as I predict that
most of my readers do. Of course, my prediction is based on an assumed selection
effect of those who read physics papers, on my own sinful pride that leads me to
assume that physicists are brighter than average, and on a psychologically-projected
assumption that most people think they are more intelligent than most people. But
if you really had good reasons for believing that you were brighter than average,
even before reading this paper, you may not really be justified in any feeling of
atypicality; it might simply be that your perceptions, like most perceptions in the
measure m(p)dp, are associated with brighter-than-average people.
I should emphasize that even if this wild conjecture, which is not an inevitable
consequence of Sensible Quantum Mechanics (but which can be considered under
this framework in a way that might be difficult under other frameworks), could be
shown to be true, I would not propose that a more intelligent person be assigned
more value or be given more political rights or privileges. It would just say that,
when weighted by the quantum-mechanical operators E(p) for perceptions, it is
conceivable that more intelligent people would have the bulk of the weight rather
than being unusual. But being in this newly-defined majority (if indeed it is the
bulk of the weight) should not confer more individual political rights or privileges,
just as with the weighting of numbers the majority of people who are economically
poor are not given more individual political rights or privileges than the minority
of people who are economically rich.
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Third, one might conjecture that an appropriate measure on perceptions might
give a possible explanation of why most of us perceive ourselves to be living on the
same planet on which our species developed. This observation might seem surprising
when one considers that we may be technologically near the point at which we could
leave Earth and colonize large regions of the Galaxy, presumably greatly increasing
the number of humans beyond the roughly 1011 that are believed to have lived on
Earth. If so, why don’t we have the perceptions of one of the vast numbers of humans
that may be born away from Earth? One answer is that some sort of doom is likely to
prevent this vast colonization of the Galaxy from happening [25, 26, 27, 28], though
these arguments are not conclusive [29]. Although I would not be surprised if such
a doom were likely, I would na¨ıvely expect it to be not so overwhelmingly probable
that the probability of vast colonization would be as small as is the presumably very
small ratio of the total number of humans who could ever live on Earth to those who
could live throughout the Galaxy if the colonization occurs. Then, even though the
colonization may be unlikely, it may still produce a higher measure for conscious
perceptions of humans living off Earth than on it.
However, another possibility is that colonization of the Galaxy is not too improb-
able, but that it is mostly done by self-replicating computers or machines who do
not tolerate many humans going along. If the number of these dominate humans as
“intelligent” beings, one might still have the question of why we perceive ourselves
as being humans rather than as being one of the vastly greater numbers of such
machines. But the explanation might simply be that the weight of conscious per-
ceptions (the sum or integral of the m(p)’s corresponding to the type of perceptions
under consideration) is dominated by human perceptions, even if the number of “in-
telligent” beings is not. In other words, human brains may be much more efficient
in producing conscious perceptions than the kinds of self-replicating computers or
machines which may be likely to dominate the colonization of the Galaxy. If such
machines are more “intelligent” than humans in terms of information-processing
cababilities and yet are less efficient in producing conscious perceptions, our percep-
tions of being human would suggest that the measure of perceptions is not merely
correlated with intelligence.
It might be tempting to take the observations that these speculations might
explain (your perception of yourself as human rather than as insect or even possibly
as more intelligent than average humans, if my prediction of that is correct, and
our perception of ourselves as humans on our home planet) as evidence tending to
support the speculations. For example, if one assigns prior probabilities P (Hi) to an
exhaustive set of hypotheses Hi (say each giving a quantum state of the universe and
a set of operators E(p) in Sensible Quantum Mechanics), and then if the conditional
probability of a perception p, given the hypothesis Hi, were P (p|Hi), by Bayes’ rule
the posterior conditional probability of the speculation Hi would be
P (Hi|p) =
P (p|Hi)P (Hi)
∑
j P (p|Hj)P (Hj)
. (8)
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Unfortunately, in Sensible Quantum Mechanics one has at most measure densities
m(p) for individual perceptions, and so one cannot unambiguously give the probabil-
ity P (p|Hi) without some specification of the normalization ofm(p) in the hypothesis
Hi. Possibly one can replace the probability for a perception with the ‘typicality’ of
the perception [15, 16]. Without some such solution to this problem, I do not see
how to use observations to turn prior probabilities (say given by some function of
the simplicity of the quantum state and perception operators) into posterior prob-
abilities for quantum states and perception operators. Otherwise it would appear
that one could only start with a given quantum state and set of perception opera-
tors, and then can one calculate the measure for all perceptions by Eq. (1) and use
Eq. (2) to calculate conditional probabilities for sets of perceptions.
7 Conclusions
In conclusion, I am proposing that Sensible Quantum Mechanics, with its Mea-
sure Axiom for Perceptions and its Sensible Quantum Axiom above, is the best
framework we have at the present level for understanding conscious perceptions and
the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Of course, the framework would only be-
come a complete theory once one had the set of all perceptions p, the basic measure
dp on it, the perception operators E(p), and the quantum state of the universe.
Even such a complete theory of perceptions and the physical world need not be
the ultimate simplest complete theory. There might be a simpler set of unifying
principles from which one could in principle deduce the perceptions, basic measure,
perception operators, and quantum state, or perhaps some simpler entities that
replaced them. For example, although in the present framework of Sensible Quantum
Mechanics, the physical world (i.e., the quantum state), along with the perception
operators, determines the measure density for perceptions in the mental world, there
might be a reverse effect of the mental world affecting the physical world to give
a simpler explanation than we have at present of the correlation between will and
action (why my desire to do something I feel am capable of doing is correlated with
my perception of actually doing it, i.e., why I “do as I please”). If the quantum state
is partially determined by an action functional, can desires in the mental world affect
that functional (say in a coordinate-invariant way that therefore does not violate
energy-momentum conservation)? Such considerations may call for a more unified
framework than Sensible Quantum Mechanics, which one might call Sensational
Quantum Mechanics. Such a more unified framework need not violate the limited
assumptions of Sensible Quantum Mechanics, though it might do that as well and
perhaps reduce to Sensible Quantum Mechanics only in a certain approximate sense.
To explain these frameworks in terms of an analogy, consider a classical model of
spinless massive point charged particles and an electromagnetic field in Minkowski
spacetime. Let the charged particles be analogous to the physical world (the quan-
tum state of the universe), and the electromagnetic field be analogous to the mental
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world (the set of perceptions with its measure m(p)dp). At the level of a simplistic
materialist mind-body philosophy, one might merely say that the electromagnetic
field is part of, or perhaps a property of, the material particles. At the level of
Sensible Quantum Mechanics, the charged particle worldlines are the analogue of
the quantum state, the retarded electromagnetic field propagator (Coulomb’s law
in the nonrelativistic approximation) is the analogue of the perception operators,
and the electromagnetic field determined by the worldlines of the charged particles
and by the retarded propagator is the mental world. (Here you can see that this
analogue of Sensible Quantum Mechanics is valid only if there are no free incoming
electromagnetic waves.) At the level of Sensational Quantum Mechanics, at which
the mental world may affect the physical world, the charged particle worldlines are
partially determined by the electromagnetic field through the change in the action
it causes. (This more unified framework better explains the previous level but does
not violate its description, which simply had the particle worldlines given.) At a yet
higher level, there is the possibility of incoming free electromagnetic waves, which
would violate the previous frameworks that assumed the electromagnetic field was
uniquely determined by the charged particle worldlines. Finally, at a still higher
level, there might be an even more unifying framework in which both charged par-
ticles and the electromagnetic field are seen as modes of a single entity (e.g., to take
a popular current speculation, a superstring).
Therefore, although it is doubtful that Sensible Quantum Mechanics is the cor-
rect framework for the final unifying theory (if one does indeed exist), it seems to
me to be a move in that direction that is consistent with what we presently know
about consciousness and the physical world.
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